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Abstract 
This article posits that design of climate adaptation interventions is co-aligned in process with the social diffusion of innovation. As such, 
innovation is fundamentally a differentiation to the status quo through trial-and-error that is designed to fail and circumvent, as much as 
it is designed to insulate and transform. Through cycles of creation and failure, social, financial and ecological capital are reorganized 
within an adaptive cycle—a process that simultaneously offers the promise of both a subjectively more equitable and more exploitive set 
of potential outcomes. Adaptation has long been regarded as neither good nor bad—it is merely a social process of learning and trade-
offs from which some may benefit and others may bear the burden. This article challenges the rhetoric that resilience and adaptation 
activities universally yield positive outcomes for society and ecology. To the contrary, only in an optimal scenario would such activities 
yield a net positive result of a more equitable and just future. In some cases, designed adaptations may be failures for some and 
successes for others.
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Resumen
Este artículo postula que el diseño de intervenciones de adaptación climática está alineado en proceso con la difusión social de la 
innovación. Como tal, la innovación es fundamentalmente una diferenciación del status quo a través de prueba y error que está diseñada 
para fallar y eludir, tanto como está diseñada para aislar y transformar. Mediante ciclos de creación y fracaso, el capital social, financiero 
y ecológico se reorganiza dentro de un ciclo adaptativo, como un proceso que simultáneamente ofrece la promesa de un conjunto de 
resultados potenciales subjetivamente más equitativo y más explotador. Durante mucho tiempo, la adaptación no se ha considerado 
ni buena ni mala; es simplemente un proceso social de aprendizaje y compensaciones del que algunos pueden beneficiarse y otros 
pueden soportar la carga Este artículo cuestiona la retórica de que las actividades de resiliencia y adaptación producen universalmente 
resultados positivos para la sociedad y ecología. Por el contrario, solo en un escenario óptimo tales actividades producirían un resultado 
neto positivo de un futuro más equitativo y justo. En algunos casos, las adaptaciones diseñadas pueden ser fracasos para algunos y 
éxitos para otros.
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Introduction
This article posits that design of climate adaptation interventions is co-aligned in 
process with the social diffusion of innovation. As such, innovation is fundamentally 
a differentiation to the status quo through trial-and-error that is designed to fail and 
circumvent, as much as it is designed to insulate and transform. Through cycles of 
creation and failure, social, financial and ecological capital are reorganized within 
an adaptive cycle—a process that simultaneously offers the promise of both a 
subjectively more equitable and a more exploitive set of potential outcomes.1 To 
this end, adaptation has long been regarded as neither good nor bad—it is merely 
a social process of learning and trade-offs from which some may benefit and 
others may bear the burden.2 This article challenges the rhetoric that resilience and 
adaptation activities universally yield positive outcomes for society and ecology. To 
that contrary, only in an optimal scenario would such activities yield a net positive 
result of a more equitable and just future. In some cases, designed adaptations 
may be failures (i.e., maladaptations) for some and successes for others. This 
potential phenomena is a fundamental axiom of climate justice in that maladaptive 
outcomes often disproportionately impact historically marginalized communities.3 
Understanding the positive, negative and neutral potential outcomes of adaptation 
and resilience interventions are central to a critical analysis of everything from the 
redesign of buildings and cities to the legislation of rules and institutions that seek 
to address environmental change and degradation.    
By the very nature of their concentration of population, cities are highly vulnerable 
to physical climate change impacts, such as urban flooding and heat stress.4 The 
literature on climate adaptation has largely focused on the mechanisms of public 
sector adaptation often to the exclusion of a broader range of stakeholders.5 These 
urban governance activities can be viewed through the lens of two institutional 
approaches—(i) a ‘dedicated’ approach that casts the adaptations as positivist 
exercises, often within a neoliberal political domain (e.g., disaster capitalism); or, 
(ii) a ‘mainstreaming’ approach that casts the adaptations as urban metabolic 
processes.6 
Much scholarly debate has focused on implementation—that is, how governance 
institutions can actually design and execute projects advanced in the name of 
resilience or adaptation. Until recently, research on design and implementation 
has had a strong focus on public sector activities that have uncritically failed to 
ask the questions: how, why and who bears the costs, consequences and 
benefits of adaptation activities?7 Although a public sector focus is consistent with 
broader ambitions for advancing public safety and social welfare, the answers to 
these questions requires a critical engagement with a wide range of agents who 
collectively operate in a complex urban ecology. This article aims to open a dialogue 
on the nature of innovation and its positive, negative and neutral implications in the 
adaptation of the built environment. Through this analytical lens, such interventions 
can be critically evaluated in terms of their impact on socio-ecological agents and 
processes. 
Innovation and Adaptation
Anthropocentric Bias in Socio-ecological Design
Given the chaotic complexity of urban ecology and the stochastic performance of 
engineered systems, how can cities ever be ‘designed’ to adapt (in a biological 
sense) to climate change? Adaptation interventions are not neutral and objective 
activities defined by science, rather they are patent and latent conduits of social 
values. It is social values that carry the weight of the diffusion of innovation.8 As 
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such, we define human systems as communication systems in the vein of Niklas 
Luhmann, in that they are distinct from their interaction with biological systems that 
are incapable of such communications.9 In recognizing that all adaptation activities 
impose some measure of costs and utilization of capital, including natural capital, a 
designer’s fundamental aim should be to minimize costs and maximize social and 
environmental benefits—a maxim of sustainability. Given the non-communication 
between human and ecological systems, this will always be a unidirectional 
extraction of natural capital no matter how “sustainable” the practices of design are. 
Design within urban ecologies cannot fully account for trade-offs between social and 
environmental welfare because human and biological systems do not communicate 
with one another. Therefore, design will almost always bias anthropogenic ends, 
and are often framed as “ecosystem services.” As a consequence, design tends 
to focus on ‘value-added’ innovations to off-set the social and environmental costs 
of adaptation itself—despite the fact that a complete off-set of environmental costs 
is dubious, given the anthropogenic bias. Yet, this does mean that one should not 
attempt such an accounting. 
Designed adaptation is fundamentally an outcome of the diffusion of innovation—a 
uniquely human process of multilateral communication. A fundamental mechanism 
of innovation is experimentation. Experimentation and the complementary 
methodological processes of design are necessary to learn from the failures and 
barriers that thwart the diffusion of innovation. By extension, design experimentation 
may be examined and contextualized at multiple scales within a range of multi-scalar 
relationships, including human and environmental trade-offs within urban ecologies. 
However, if anthropocentric adaptation is a function of social communication, it 
must always be external to the adaptation of complex biological systems. Any 
designs or interventions that promise full socio-ecological integration may be well 
intended, but they are more likely an outcome associated with ‘greenwashing.’ 
Value-Added Innovation as Motivation for Change
Innovation can be defined as “an idea, practice or object which is perceived as new 
by an individual or unit of adoption.”10 A multidisciplinary survey of the definition of 
innovation found over 60 different scholarly definitions, most of which implied new 
or improved products, services and processes.11 Innovation is rarely more than 
differentiation through a process of trial and error, wherein one is just as likely to fail 
and create negative value than one is to succeed and create a new positive value 
(i.e., ‘value-added’). Very often when people speak in popular terms of innovation, 
they are referencing value-added innovation without acknowledging that much 
innovation is destructive or regressive. 
By extension, innovation can be simplified to a process of differentiation by 
which one is likely to fail many more times than they will succeed in creating a 
value-added benefit. This axiom often defines the parameters of iterative design. 
Although, it should be acknowledged that design may also formally involve the 
disciplined methods associated with experimentation and scientific inquiry. In that 
sense, design is not exclusively a reactionary process of differentiation. Design 
is both proactive and reactive to parameters both known and unknown. But, the 
design of adaptation can be argued to be largely a function of differentiation to an 
unsustainable status quo and is therefore more fundamentally at least as reactive 
as it is proactive.  
Designed adaptation and innovation in the built environment may fall within two 
categories—engineered systems (e.g., buildings) and rules (e.g., institutions). Given 
climate change’s widespread impacts, effective adaptation must address both 
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categories, as each are co-dependent. Whether one views institutions through the 
lens of ‘rational choice institutionalism,’ as rules of the game exogenously derived,12 
or ‘sociological institutionalism,’ as rules endogenously derived from the playing 
of the game,13 the rules are in place to provide the stability of members of an 
institution through an efficiency derived from the minimization of transaction costs.14 
This stability function of institutions is analogous the reversionary performance of 
engineering and ecological resilience.15  
When one changes the rules (i.e., differentiating innovation), there are transaction 
costs that may or may not be equally borne by the members of the institution—or 
by society as a whole. Unequal distribution of such costs may lead to inequitable 
and unjust outcomes, even though the innovative adaptation itself may advance 
the interests of most institutional members. Uncompensated private costs to 
change may prevent institutional members from advancing change—by extension, 
a small group of agents may limit adaptation that would have otherwise benefited 
a broader urban constituency. Value-added innovation may serve to offset these 
private costs and ease the transition for the collective internalization of change 
within the members of the institution of the now regularized or increasingly 
regularized transaction costs (e.g., increasing insurance costs associated with sea 
level rise and storm surge). This is built on the assumption that the members within 
the institution are seeking benefit maximization and are bound by some form of a 
paradox of collective rationality. 
Therefore, the greater the value-add in the innovation—and the more distributed 
that benefit is—then the more likely it is that members will be motivated to change 
the rules or the play of the game because the additional value from innovation 
outweighs the transaction costs of a new adapted institutional exchange. An 
example of this relates to broader calls for increasing the performance standards 
associated with building codes. Uncompensated private costs in increased 
construction costs to homebuilders motivated the homebuilders to heavily lobby 
against the adaptation of building codes to include parameters associated with 
changing environmental ranges (e.g., larger gutters for increased rainfall events). 
These anti-adaptation preferences were only recently reversed in light of the value-
added benefits of risk reduction associated with increased insurance coverage and 
reduced insurance premiums.
As previously noted, innovation can lead to failure in its execution and application 
and is in itself not an absolute good. Innovation is only the process mechanism by 
which value can be generated and diffused. Therefore, innovation is merely the 
mechanism by which one form of change is effectuated, and may lead to either 
or both adaptation and maladaptation. For example, consider the case of coastal 
geographies increasingly at risk from climate change. Buildings may be designed 
with any number of resilience innovations to withstand those impacts. But, those 
same engineered designs may be maladaptive in that they breed a false sense of 
confidence of the buildings’ capacity to withstand sea level rise—a condition that 
undermines supporting infrastructure that is outside of the scope of engineering 
resilience designs at the building scale. For some short- to mid-term building 
owners and occupants, resilience design may be adaptive, for instances in areas 
not subject to future permanent inundation, but are otherwise subject to increased 
flood risks. 
Yet, for others, such as long-term building owners and occupants, it may be 
maladaptive as frequently as it is adaptive. For instance, consider the design 
intervention of raising the elevation of house. This may offer short-term risk reduction, 
but the process of elevating the structure often reduces the material lifecycle of the 
house because of increased exposure to water and moisture from which the house 
was not originally designed to withstand. Indeed, for low-income renters, new 
resilience-driven building codes may impose additional costs that disproportionately 
burden the costs of housing with little expected-value upside because they do not 
bear the benefits of risk reduction to the building assets that they do not own. In 
this case, designed adaptation and innovation in the corresponding institutions 
may be yield positive, negative and neutral outcomes depending on who bears the 
costs and burdens. Here, renters disproportionately bear the cost-burden, while 
owners yield most of the benefit. Over the long-run, however, renters may yield the 
benefits from reduced risks from uninsured losses to household contents, while 
building owners may bear the burden of a false confidence in economic devaluation 
associated with owning a building in an increasingly high-risk geography. This case 
highlights that adaptation and maladaptation may manifested to different parties 
over different time horizons. These scenarios and outcomes are almost always 
outside of the scope of the immediacy and unidimensional differentiation of reactive 
designed adaptation. 
Diffusion and Experimentation 
If adaptation and innovation are closely linked as social processes, then adaptation 
may well follow a similar pattern as the socialization and diffusion of innovative 
knowledge.16 Zilberman, Zhao and Heiman (2012) argue that the processes of 
adaptation could follow the five stages first identified by Everett M. Roger in his now 
classic 1962 work, Diffusion of Innovations (2010).17 The five stages of diffusion of 
innovation are knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation and confirmation. 
These stages were drawn from thousands of empirical studies and have been 
shown to fit consistently within an ‘S-Curve.’ In this case, the S-Curve is a measure 
of how many members of a potential class adopt innovation at any given stage 
(e.g., early versus late adopters). By extension, adaptation may also follow a similar 
‘S-Curve.’ As interpreted by Frederickson et al., in The Adapted City (2004), this 
S-Curve entails a series of eras of experimentation in which institutions design 
and test innovations through trial and error, in the same way that design is often 
iteratively experimental.18 The ups and downs—the cycles of use and production—
are common to both design and innovation.
As represented in Figures 1 and 2, this is conceptually consistent with the process 
of adaptation relative to climate change. For a time, adaptation may lead to periods 
of stability, only to be followed by tumult. This alters the trajectory of adaptation, 
until a new innovation is developed (through emergent and cumulative learning 
and communication) and communicated, at which point another period of stability 
prevails. As such, adaptation and maladaptation can be conceptualized as processes 
along of trajectory of periodic moments of resilience, wherein stability (a relative 
anthropocentric concept) is periodically maintained in response to various shocks 
and stresses stemming from the economic, social and environmental impacts. As 
these responses to shocks and stresses are diffused through communication, 
a stage of resilience and stability is reached until such point as the shocks and 
stresses exceed the threshold of that particular state of resilience. In this sense, 
the trajectory is not necessarily as linear as is represented, but rather it is dynamic 
across multiple axes wherein the same intervention may have both progressive and 
regressive impacts depending on the intersubjective nature of the analysis.  
People are biased to seek the status quo, but these brief periods of stability must be 
contextualized on a broader trajectory of either adaptation or maladaptation. This 
trajectory may vary significantly for any given object (e.g., building) or subject (e.g., 
institutional rules) of design intent. Of course, one never knows whether the sum of 
one’s actions or intents may ultimately lead toward adaptation or maladaptation; only 
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history will determine that. Yet, this conceptualization is important to understand 
the impacts of one’s actions in year zero. This is precisely how and why the idea of 
path dependency has been so widely utilized in the climate adaptation academies.19 
Although Figures 1 and 2 suggest continuity and linearity of change, empirical 
evidence and history suggest otherwise. Rather, the diffusion of innovation (good 
and bad) over time looks something like a composite of Everett’s original—now 
famous—S-Curve.
One has to leave open the door that adaptive design may be good or bad depending 
on which people benefit from the change. Change may lead to adaptation for 
one actor and maladaptation to another, or some other inequitable distribution. 
For instance, the luxury real estate industry uses resilience as a marketing pitch. 
The buildings they design have the technology of engineering resilience, but the 
buildings are located in high-risk geographies that yield collective maladaptive 
outcomes for everyone else. Some have argued that this partitioning of resources 
with even the best intentions may lead to a type of climate gentrification as an 
outcome to resilience investments.20 In sum, there is nothing necessarily equitable 
or efficient about adaptation or resilience; current evidence suggests that those 
who can afford such interventions are the ones who benefit the most. Designers 
must resist the temptation that turn resilience into yet another amenity.
Of course, the exact trajectory and curvature of the S-curve will vary. As the nature 
of innovation is fundamentally unpredictable, the wave dimensions and amplitudes 
shown in Figures 1 and 2 would vary accordingly. It could be argued that, if an 
institution creates efficiencies that promote maladaptation, then it accelerates 
change within its own life cycle toward decreasing the risk of failure. In other words, 
if institutions (or even buildings) are on a course of maladaptation, then failure may 
not necessarily be a bad thing, as it may cut losses and prevent further reliance on 
bad rules and behaviours. Thus, a maladaptive trajectory could, in theory, lead to 
adaptation—but the costs of failure and the benefits of the reorganization of capital 
in favour of resilience and stability may be inequitably distributed. For instance, 
there are examples of coastal communities throughout the U.S. wherein the public 
and private sectors have made investments into buildings and infrastructure that 
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[Fig. 1] Adaptation as Diffusion of Innovation. (Positive Net Value 
Innovation) Adapted from Rogers, 2010; Gersonius, 2012.
[Fig. 2] Maladaptation as Diffusion of Innovation. (Equal or Negative 
Net Value Innovtion) Adapted from Rogers, 2010; Gersonius, 2012.
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are located in areas that are rapidly disappearing because of coastal erosion 
and subsidence.21 These investments have delayed difficult decisions and have 
stimulated a reliance by local populations that is largely maladaptive. In some 
cases, major storms have caused large-scale failure of these built environment 
systems and the decision has been made to manage a relocation.22 This is an 
example where maladaptation may have a threshold—beyond which either failure 
or adaptation are the only alternatives. 
For instance, managed retreat from the coasts may be adaptive for governments 
and holders of financial capital, but it may be maladaptive for low-income 
populations with limited resources to relocate. Alternately, there may be superior 
social outcomes for vulnerable populations who have been steered away from such 
high-risk geographies. Indeed, one could argue that the coastal real estate industry 
is on a broader trajectory of maladaptation. Yet, when this sector fails in the face of 
flooding and sea level rise, it will lead to transformations with winners and losers. The 
losers will be banks and homeowners. The winners will likely be renters who benefit 
from the void of resident homeowners and future homeowners who were steered 
to less risky geographies. Ultimately, short-term benefits that may accrue to renters 
will ultimately manifest in unmitigated long-term risks wherein all parties are losers.   
Evaluating Designed Adaptation
The notion of trial and error is critical to this theoretical association with designed 
adaptation. Gersonius identifies both static and dynamic modes of assessing 
adaptation (2012)23, as represented in modified form in Figure 3. One could argue 
that, if errors are made in a dynamic process, then the time lost is less than under 
the alternative circumstance (that is, an error made under static conditions) because 
there is flexibility and room to correct the mistake. Conversely, if errors are made in 
static environments, then it takes more time to correct because of a lack of relative 
flexibility from which to correct the error. Likewise, correcting the error may only 
bring the system or institution back to the predicate state and not an optimal one—
assuming optimality is even possible (generally, it is not). Herein lies the challenge 
of stationarity in the design of systems and institutions. The goal is to design for the 
adaptive capacity to accommodate both knowns and unknowns.24
It can be argued that because of the long useful life of buildings, the application 
of Net Present Value (“NPV”) investment calculations based on “average or worst-
case scenarios” are static decisions that set the stage for greater costs of time 
and resources in the event of error and/or failure.25 In this regard, the design of 
buildings, particularly in flood zones, often revolves around statistical estimates 
of chance that revert to the mean potential range of outcomes in the advance 
of economic ‘efficiency.’ Likewise, even though more sophisticated methods exist 
within engineering practices, they are subverted to the economic performance of 
real estate and infrastructure and the conservative practice conventions of design 
and construction. Therefore, the temporal notion of Frederickson et al.’s eras and 
epochs would be consistent with the inevitable trial-and-error process of resilience 
measures along some curve of either adaptation or maladaptation for real estate 
and infrastructure. In other words, the life-cycle of buildings may or may not benefit 
from the diffusion of innovation in a broader adaptive trajectory that would otherwise 
ensure the stability and safety of a building. The risk of failure is significant. 
The challenge is to design the adaptive capacity of a building (or infrastructural 
system) to account for dynamic and not static future operational parameters. 
Dynamic experiments could be conceptualized, at scale, as being components 
and systems of buildings that can be changed at relatively lower material, social and 
environmental costs than the alternative. In this case, innovation is synonymous with 
technology as envisioned by Rogers. Rogers defined a technology as a “design for 
instrumental action that reduces the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationship in 
achieving a desired outcome.”26 By definition, a technology then allows adaptation 
to move from static to dynamic as certainty in cause-effect reduces risk and creates 
more room for variable measures. As global efforts for the research, development 
and production of building system technologies are advanced and the economics 
of scale reduce unit costs, then overall institutional adaptation is advanced by virtue 
of accelerated pace of trial and error. It could also be argued that these lower costs 
to experimentation would increase positive robustness of the adaptation in terms 
of diversity and depth of experience in an evolutionary context. This may increase 
not only the pace of the long-term trajectory of change, but also the likelihood that 
the change is adaptive and not maladaptive.27 
The practice of architecture and real estate is not simply about the design, construction 
and operations of buildings. It is also about the siting of those buildings across 
scales of time and space within larger socio-economic and physical parameters and 
cultural ethics. This is representative of the problem of scale endemic in the analysis 
of climate change and the notion of deliberate and systematic responsive planning 
thereto.28 Because of the long useful life of infrastructure supported land, the 
implications for error should be contextualized within the rate of change associated 
with eras and epochs over multiple generations—this is the time scale of cities. 
At least that was the old way of thinking about it. Climate change impacts—
combined with ecological degradation—significantly challenge the time horizons 
of the fixity of land. If the fixity of land was at the origins of the bias to disregard the 
future, design practice can no longer look away. Critical analysis supporting the 
adaptation (and adaptive capacity) of buildings and infrastructure should include a 
broader set of variables in an ecosystem that includes people and the environment. 
While this makes things infinitely more complex in the consequences of failure, 
there is little alternative in light of a very dire assessment of the future the built 
environment in the face of climate change. While human design agency can never 
fully account for environmental trade-offs, the design ethos and utilize professional 
ethics to internalize these trade-offs in recognition of what it means to define the 
success or failure of any given innovation. 
26 Everett Rogers, et al., “Complex Adaptive 
Systems and the Diffusion of Innovations”.
27 Orion Lewis, and Sven Steinmo, “How 
Institutions Evolve: Evolutionary Theory and 
Institutional Change”, Polity 44, 3 (2012): 314-
339. doi: 10.1057/pol.2012.1
28 Neil Adger, et. al., “Successful Adaptation 
to Climate Change Across Scales”, Global 
Environmental Change 15, 2 (2005): 77-86. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2004.12.005
[Fig. 3] Evaluating Adaptation in the Built 
Environment. Source: Gersonius, 2012.
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162 Conclusion
This paper takes the position that adaptation and innovation are co-aligned in the 
diffusion of social innovation through social learning and communication. Innovation 
pushes forward as a process of differentiation, while adaptation—like design—may 
be both reactionary differentiation and proactive experimentation. The risk of failure 
and maladaptation is always on the horizon for both innovation and adaptation, 
respectively. Design has always been the exercise from which differentiation in 
culture and technology has advanced both human progress and environmental 
extraction. Examples of regenerative design (at-scale) are limited. As such, adaptation 
and resilience designs do not represent absolute goods. They are processes on a 
continuum of communication exchange that diffuses innovation—the good and the 
bad. They manifest in both successes and failures. The challenges for designers 
and the broader institutions of industry that support the production of the built 
environment is that time scales and economic interests are misaligned. 
This is an old story; what’s new is that climate change imposes new parameters and 
conditions on the design of rules, institutions and ultimately buildings, which in turn 
produces new horizons for getting it right or wrong. Stationarity in buildings and 
institutions is out. Dynamic performance that internalizes failure is in. The challenge 
is that as one internalizes more variables and responsibilities in adaptation, there 
is a greater risk of failure. The upside of failure is the opportunity to learn and to 
accelerate that learning in the translation of more distributively equitable ideas that 
benefit society and ecology. 
In this sense, designers of buildings and institutions must embrace the possibility 
of failure, but they must do so with a critical reflection on who bears that burden 
of getting it wrong. The challenge ahead is to evaluate ostensibly adaptive and 
resilient interventions that are all too often agents of disaster capitalism. Such a 
critical appraisal must recognize the subjective nature of the outcomes—positive, 
negative, and neutral—and the likelihood that the affected parties will include 
both winners and losers. With these considerations in mind, these concepts may 
advance the design of interventions that advance collective measures of social and 
environmental welfare. 
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